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Abstract
Based on the analysis of Chinese gem listed company 
equity incentive the implementation of the status quo, 
on the basis of choosing the gem in 2011, in 2012 the 
implementation of equity incentive plan of the 55 of listed 
companies and the matching with the implementation of 
equity incentive of 55 transverse comparison of listed 
companies, found that the gem listed company equity 
incentive can improve the company’s performance. 
Selected by August 31, 2013, 114 published the draft 
of the equity incentive of the gem listed companies as 
samples, using linear regression analysis, found that 
the validity of equity incentive, incentive, stock option 
incentive model and company performance there is no 
significant correlation.
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1.  THE GEM LISTED COMPANY EQUITY 
INCENTIVE STATUS QUO
1.1 The Number of Companies to Launch Equity 
Incentive Status Quo
Equity incentive policy is more and more popular in 
the gem listed companies, as of December 31, 2013 the 
gem listed companies has reached 356, of which the 
implementation of equity incentive has 147 accounts for 
41.29% of the total. From the point of the release time 
of the draft of the equity incentive. In 2010, 18 equity 
incentive drafts announced gem listed companies, In 
2011, 37 equity incentive drafts announced gem listed 
companies, in 2012, 48 equity incentive drafts announced 
gem listed companies in 2013, 60 equity incentive drafts 
announced gem listed companies, a trend of increased year 
by year. Some of the gem listed companies released more 
than once equity incentive draft, such as ShenZhouTaiyue, 
etc. Gem implement equity incentive on the number of 
companies in the a-share listed companies occupy A 
considerable proportion. Detailed in the following table.
Table 1
In 2010-2013 Gem Equity Incentive Distribution and 
Account for the Proportion of A-share Listed Companies
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013
The gem listed companies 18 37 48 60
A-share listed Companies 66 114 118 158
Percentage 27.27% 32.46% 40.68% 37.97%
Note. Data sources: according to the tide of information network 
data sorting.
A shares the plate on the implementation of equity 
incentive, the GEM become one of the main force on the 
implementation of equity incentive, the reason: listed on 
the gem is mainly for new and high technology industries, 
a strong demand for talent, and much more urgent demand 
for equity incentive; Traditional industries and the state 
holding listed companies (such as oil, finance, real estate, 
cement, nonferrous metal and other monopoly industries 
and enterprises) are mainly distributed in the main board, 
restriction of national policies and mechanisms, although 
the strong demand for equity incentive, but it is difficult, 
limited effect. A period of time in the future, therefore, 
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in the gem listed company equity incentive policy 
implementation in the a-share listed companies will still 
occupies the important position.
1.2  The Choice of Incentive Pattern Analysis
From the practice of equity incentive plans of listed 
companies, the equity incentive patterns usually include 
stock options, restricted stock, performance shares, stock 
appreciation rights and phantom stock, etc. And at the 
present stage the most motivational tools in use are mainly 
stock options and restricted stock. The statistics from 18 
listed companies with equity incentive draft of GEM 2010 
shows that there are 14 of them using the stock options, 
3 using restricted stock and one using a hybrid mode. It 
shows there are 30 companies with stock options, 5 with 
restricted stock and 2 with a mixed mode from 37 listed 
companies in 2011. In 2012, there are 18 companies with 
stock options, 17 with restricted stock and 13 with a mixed 
mode. In 2013, there are 25 companies with stock options, 
22 with restricted stock and 13 with a mixed mode.
From the above data we find that in 2010 and 2011 the 
early year of GEM board most of the listed companies 
with equity incentive tend to use the incentive mode, 
while in 2012 and 2013 restricted stock mode and stock 
option come to a balance. During 2012 to 2013, more 
and more companies use mixed mode, the differences 
of choice tendency become smaller and this shows the 
current program of listed companies gradually specialized, 
sophisticated and personalized.
1.3  The Distribution of the Incentive Ratio
According to “Equity Incentive Management of Listed 
Companies (Trial)”, total number of listed companies 
equity incentive proportion should not exceed 10% of 
the total equity, and the cumulative total number of each 
object should not exceed 1% of the total equity.
According to statistics, listed companies proportion of 
equity incentive averaged 3.17 percent. And among these, the 
lowest percentage of incentive shares was Sanchuan which 
was 0.45%, the highest was 9.47% of Amway shares. Others 
were between them. As we can see from Table 2, proportions 
of the companies in our country listed on GEM equity 
incentive concentrated from 1% to 5% the total equity at the 
time which is lower than the western countries.
1.4  The Distribution of the Effective Period of 
Equity Incentive
Here effective period refers to the period that incentive 
objects exercise the rights conferred by the equity. The 
length of the period needs to be made by the equity 
incentive mode settings. Since the implement of our major 
business is stock option mode. And the article of “Equity 
Incentive Management of Listed Companies (Trial)” 
states the interval from the date of stock options granted 
to the first row of the right can not less than one year. The 
effective period calculated from the granted date can not 
exceed ten years. In this 163 listed companies, in addition 
to the information did not specify Wanda incentive is 
valid, the remaining 162, only one enterprise Ningbo 
GQy whose validity of this reached the upper limit of 
10 years and the shortest validity is three years and only 
three. The average validity is 4.51 years. Most of the 
effective period of the listed companies is 4 or 5 years.
2.  RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1  Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
In China, scholars do lots of research with the relevant 
data of Chinese enterprises equity incentive and wondered 
whether there is any relationship between the equity 
incentive and corporate performance. But they have not 
reach the same conclusion. Some scholars believe that 
there is no correlation between the equity incentive and 
corporate performance. Zhu (2010) did the empirical 
research on the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
listed companies, not distinguished the incentive mode 
and industry. He chosen the company’s managements 
who have the company’s stock during 2000 to 2005 as an 
initial sample and he got 659 companies. He concluded 
equity incentive of listed Companies in general terms is 
invalid. Although equity incentive modulus is positive, but 
other statistics are very small. There was no correlation 
between them at the meaning of statistics. Qian (2012) 
used those SMEs who declared the implementation of 
equity incentive as the original sample. Through a two-
year before and after incentive policy’s change results 
and compare the performance of the implementation of 
horizontal equity of SMEs found that the SME board 
listed company equity incentive effect not significant. 
According to the implement of equity from 1 January 2011 
to 31 December 2011 of incentives in listed companies in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, Feng (2013) randomly selected 
37 companies as the sample and carried out the analysis 
of the data using SPSS 17. 0. 
The results obtained from the analysis showed the 
impact of equity incentive for the ROE is not significant. 
Effective implementation of equity incentive is largely 
count on the design of incentive programs and companies 
should combine the actual situation and promote the 
effectiveness of incentive programs. Liu (2012) use those 
who launch equity incentive programs listed companies 
in 2006-2009 as samples. He did the empirical analysis 
about the relationship between the equity incentive and 
the performance of the company and concluded that there 
was no linear relationship between the proportion of 
listed companies incentives and corporate performance. 
yang (2013) on the basis of equity incentives of Chinese 
listed companies on the status of implementation of the 
analysis, selected 198 listed companies who implemented 
equity incentive between 2009-2011. She use correlation 
analysis and multiple linear regression analysis and did 
the empirical analysis about the relationship between the 
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equity incentive and the performance of the company 
and concluded that there was no linear relationship 
between the proportion of listed companies incentives 
and corporate performance. But some researchers 
found the company’s equity incentive can improve the 
performance of the company and make a certain role. 
As Zhou and yan (2013) took Shanghai and Shenzhen 
A-share listed companies as the research object in 2011 
and did the empirical analysis of equity incentive impact 
on the performance of listed companies by multiple linear 
regression analysis, verified equity incentives can enhance 
the performance of listed companies. Zhe and Xu (2013) 
took Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies 
as the research objects in 2010 and did the empirical 
analysis of equity incentive impact on the performance of 
listed companies using Eviews software, concluded it was 
a positive correlation between equity incentive and the 
value of listed companies. Jin (2010) selected those listed 
companies who announced the implementation of equity 
incentive and eventually put into the implementation 
phase before April 30, 2008 as a sample. The findings 
showed that small board listed companies can enhance 
the performance of the company. This paper proposes 
the hypothesis based on the conclusions of the existing 
literature references.
Hypothesis 1: The equity incentive of the GZM listed 
companies can enhance the role of the company’s performance.
Equity incentive degree that the equity ratio of equity 
incentives is an important design element of the contract, 
the convergence hypothesis of the interests shows a 
higher stake could make the manager bundled together 
with the interests of shareholders, and the shareholders 
concerned about their own identity in order to improve 
as a shareholder responsibility which can maximize the 
capacity and technology. Despite many of our scholars 
believe that the proportion of Chinese equity incentive 
is too small and the corporate governance is not perfect, 
equity incentives did not make a significant effect. 
However, some scholars concluded by the empirical 
research there was a positive correlation between the 
degree of equity incentives and company performance. 
Song and Rong (2012) used the A-share listed companies 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock from 2006 to 2008 for 
as data sample, the empirical verified the relationship 
between equity incentives and earnings management, 
found that the number of equity incentives and earnings 
management a significant positive correlation. Fu 
(2013) used those listed companies who implement 
equity incentives during 2006 to 2011 as study sample, 
the findings showed that the strength of the equity 
incentive and performance of the company made positive 
correlation. Therefore, this paper put up hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: The degree of equity incentive of the 
GZM listed companies and the company’s performance 
make positive correlation.
Here effective period refers to the period that incentive 
objects exercise the rights conferred by the equity. 
The length of the period need to be made by the equity 
incentive mode settings. Since the implement of our major 
business is stock option mode. And the article of “Equity 
Incentive Management of Listed Companies (Trial)” 
states the interval from the date of stock options granted 
to the first row of the right can not less than one year. The 
effective period calculated from the granted date can not 
exceed ten years. The statistics show the average validity 
of the Chinese companies listed on GEM is 4.51 years 
and a little short compared with Western countries. Equity 
incentive is a long-term incentive policy, the longer 
incentive validity have the more obvious the effect would 
be. Therefore, this paper put forward hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: The effective period of equity incentive 
of the GZM listed companies and the company’s 
performances make positive correlation.
The patterns of equity incentive usually include equity 
incentive stock options, restricted stock, performance 
shares, stock appreciation rights and phantom stock 
and so on. Chinese equity incentive of GEM listed 
companies only use stock options, restricted stock, and 
both mixed mode. According to the statistics the use of 
stock options up to 53.37%, restricted stock and mixed-
mode respectively 28.83% and 17.80%. Since most 
companies choose stock options mode, indicating that 
most companies think stock options can better improve 
the performance of the company, so this paper put forward 
hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4: Stock option model can improve the 
performance of the company better.
2.2  Variable Settings
(1) Explained variables. According to previous 
research and the draft GEM listed companies equity 
incentive, most companies use a total return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (roe), etc., as a measure of 
company’s performance indicators. These indicators may 
reflect the added value of owners’ equity, the company’s 
competitiveness and long-term growth potential and also 
has good comparable.
(2) Explanatory variables. Equity incentive degree 
(strength) indicates the total number of issued incentive 
percentage of total share capital when signing incentive 
plan. Equity incentive mode, due to stock option model 
belongs to qualitative data so using dummy variables to 
represent stock options and stock option takes 1, other 
modes take 0. The validity of equity incentive can check 
from the draft of GEM listed companies.
(3) Variable control. When to research the factors 
affecting the performance of the company, not only the 
equity incentive would affect the company’s performance 
but also balance sheets, etc. will have an impact on 
company performance. In order to better study the 
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equity incentive impact on company performance, so 
the company’s size (size), asset-liability ratio (LEV), 
total asset turnover (ATO) become the control variables. 
Relevant variables are described below.
Table 4
Variable Settings
Name Type Code Definition
Return on net assets
Explained variables
ROE Net profit/Net assets
Return on total assets ROA Net Profit/Total assets
Equity incentive degree
Explanatory variables
Strength Total number of issued incentive/incentive plan The total share capital when the company signed
Equity incentive mode Model Dummy variable, taking 1 when the mode is stock option, the other takes 0
Equity incentive validity Validity the number of years about equity incentive validity 
Size of the company
Controls of variables
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Asset-liability ratio LEV Total Liabilities/Total Assets
Total asset turnover ATO Operating income/total assets
2.3  Model Design
Model 1: ROE = C1 + a1Strength + a2Model + 
a3Validity + a4Size + a5LEV + a6 + ATO + ε
Model 2: ROA = C2 + b1Strength + b2Model + 
b3Validity + b4Size + b5LEV + b6 + ATO + ε
C1, C2 is constant, a1~a6, b1~b6 is coefficient,ε is error term.
2.4  Sample Selection and Data Sources
This paper researches the impact of GEM listed 
companies equity incentives on the performance of the 
company. The sample is the GEM in 2011 and 55 listed 
companies in 2012. And according to the same industry, 
the same time to the market, listed companies without 
the implementation of equity incentive, differences of the 
asset size within 5% (choosing the closest to value if when 
you select more than 5% still no match, then removed 
the sample) and other conditions, we selected 55 listed 
companies as paired samples. We selected the third quarter 
financial data of listed companies in 2012&2013 and used 
independent T-test method for horizontal comparison 
about equity incentive effect of companies listed on GEM 
(as some companies have not yet released the annual 
report in 2013, so we selected the third quarter report 
data). When in the study of degree of the equity incentive, 
incentive mode, validity of the equity incentives how to 
affect performance of the company, the selected sample 
is the 114 listed companies on GEM who published the 
equity incentive draft before August 31, 2013 (excluding 
ST, ST*, and in this delisted companies during the time; 
excluding those revoked, stopped the implementation and 
incomplete data listed companies). Empirical research 
selected the first three quarters of 2013 annual data and 
used linear regression analysis. Measurable indicators of 
company equity incentive effect is ROA, ROE, and the 
data comes from the WIND database, CHINF GEM (http://
www.cninfo.com.cn/). Data were analyzed using statistical 
software spss 17.0.
3.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
3.1  Equity Incentive Impact on Company 
Performance Test
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Year Project
The companies implement equity incentive The companies without equity incentive All listed companies
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE
2012
Minimum - 0.0100 - 0.0200 - 0.0300 - 0.0400 - 0.0300 - 0.0400
Maximum 0.1000 0.1500 0.1200 0.1400 0.1200 0.1500
Mean 0.4480 0.5730 0.0341 0.0420 0.0394 0.0496
Standard deviation 0.2474 0.3148 0.0270 0.0311 0.0263 0.0321
2013
Minimum - 0.0300 - 0.0700 - 0.0200 - 0.0200 - 0.0300 - 0.0700
Maximum 0.1000 0.1800 0.1400 0.1600 0.1400 0.1800
Mean 0.0396 0.0530 0.0301 0.0389 0.0349 0.0460
Standard deviation 0.0300 0.0417 0.0305 0.0365 0.0305 0.3963
From the Table 5, we can find the average ROA and 
ROE of the implementation of GEM listed company’s 
equity incentive were 0.0448, 0.5730 which were higher 
than the companies without equity incentive separately 
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0.0341, 0.0420. By 2012 and 2013 data comparison, we 
can see that the number of the performance of the GEM 
equity incentive companies declined, but by comparing 
all the data of 2012 and 2013 listed companies we can see 
the performance of all listed companies have generally 
declined, it can be inferred that the annual decline in 
performance may be caused by the greater environmental 
impact. Although in 2013 the implementation of equity 
incentive performance of listed companies has declined, 
but still higher than the non-implementation of the listed 
company’s equity incentive. Then by independent sample 
T-test about the performance indicators (ROA, ROE) of 
the companies and the paired companies we can make the 
statistical analysis.
Table 6
Statistics
The company type N Mean Standard deviation Standard error of the mean
ROA
The sample company 55 0.0448 0.0247 0.0033
Matching company 55 0.0341 0.0270 0.0036
ROE The sample company 55 0.0573 0.0315 0.0043
Matching company 55 0.0420 0.0311 0.0042
Table 7
Independent Sample Test Results
Levene test of 
variance equations The mean equation of t test
F sig t df sig.(On both sides) The mean difference
Standard error 
values
ROA
Assuming equal 
variance 0.3710 0.5440 2.1540 108.0000 0.0330 0.0106 0.0049
Assumes that the 
variance is not equal 2.1540 107.1960 0.0340 0.0106 0.0049
ROE
Assuming equal 
variance 0.0060 0.9370 2.5730 108.0000 0.0110 0.0154 0.0060
Assumes that the 
variance is not equal 2.5730 107.9870 0.0110 0.0154 0.0060
Table 7 shows that the observations of ROA and ROE 
are separately 2.1540 and 2.5730 and the corresponding P 
values were 0.0106, 0.0154 significantly less than level of 
0.05, so you can reject the hypothesis. And that indicates 
ROA and ROE have significant differences between 
the sample companies and paired sample companies. 
Seen from the difference between the mean average, the 
sample companies is higher than the proportion of sample 
companies, implemental side have better performance 
than the other side. Since they have controlled the 
industry, size, time to the market at the beginning. 
Therefore, the difference of empirical can be considered 
as a result of the implementation of incentive stock 
options, the implementation of the GEM equity incentive 
for companies can improve the performance of a certain 
action and so it prove the hypothesis 1. 
3.2  Research of Elements of Equity Incentive 
Contract’s Impact on the Performance of the 
Company 
For hypothesis 2, 3, 4, it use spss17.0 and make regression 
analysis about the variables of Model 1 and Model 2. The 
results are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8
Regression Coefficients
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B Coefficient t sig B Coefficient t sig
C - 0.3310 - 3.2680 0.0010 - 0.4770 - 3.5470 0.0010 
Validity - 0.0030 - 0.0690 -0.8610 0.3910 - 0.0030 - 0.0530 - 0.6260 0.5320 
Model 0.0020 0.0350 0.4310 0.6680 0.0050 0.0570 0.6680 0.5060 
Strength - 0.2570 - 0.1130 - 1.4430 0.1520 - 0.3030 - 0.1050 - 1.2840 0.2020 
Size 0.0200 0.3460 4.0000 0.0000 0.2600 0.3680 4.1530 0.0000 
Lev - 0.1500 - 0.7180 - 7.0440 0.0000 - 0.1130 - 0.4270 - 3.9900 0.0000 
Ato 0.0440 0.4510 4.7080 0.0000 0.0620 0.5000 4.9680 0.0000 
Fvalue 10.0530 7.4590 
Adjust The R Square 0.3250 0.2550 
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 
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As we can see from Model 1 of Table 8, the adjustment 
of the model is 0.3250 in R indicating a good fit of the 
Model 1. The statistic of F is 10.0530 and sig is 0.0000 
which less than 0.05 indicating that the model in general 
is significant. Model 2 is also significant as a whole, but 
its adjusted R is 0.2550 less than Model 1 whose adjusted 
R is 0.325, so the fit of the Model 1 higher than Model 2. 
Judging from the results of the Model 1 regression 
coefficient of incentive validity is - 0.0690, t value of 
-0.8610, whose sig is 0.3910 significantly greater than 
the 0.05 level and so the hypothesis 3 has not been 
confirmed. Excitation pattern model one’s regression 
coefficients is 0.0350, t value of 0.4310, its associated 
probability of 0.6680 sig significantly greater than 0.05, 
indicating that there is no significant correlation between 
stock options and performance of the company. Equity 
incentive degree’s regression coefficients is -0.1130, t 
value of -1.4430, which is accompanied by the probability 
of 0.1520 sig greater than the level of 0.05 and indicating 
that there is no significant correlation between the 
stock incentive and corporate performance. Therefore 
hypothesis 2 and assuming 4 also are not been confirmed. 
The results from model 1 show the size of company, asset 
turnover have  significantly positive correlation with the 
total return on assets ROA and the regression coefficients 
is separately 0.3460,0.4510. Asset-liability ratio and return 
on assets ROA have significantly negative correlation and 
the regression coefficient is -0.7180. 
The results from the regression of Model 2 is the same 
with the Model 1 and further validate the conclusions of 
Model 1.
CONCLUSION
This paper selected 55 listed companies in 2011 and 2012 
as well as the implementation of equity incentive 55 listed 
companies without the implemention of equity incentive 
which paired on the industry, time to market, company 
size, etc. We selected the third quarter financial data of 
listed companies in 2012 & 2013 and used independent 
T-test method for horizontal comparison about equity 
incentive effect of companies listed on GEM and found 
companies listed on GEM equity incentive can improve 
their performance to a certain role. Else we chose the 
114 listed companies on GEM who published the equity 
incentive draft before August 31, 2013, using linear 
regression analysis about the annual reports of the first third 
quarter 2013 data and found that the influence validity of 
equity incentive and incentive strength of the company 
make to performance of the company have no significant 
correlation. Equity incentive validity, as well as the degree 
of equity incentive and incentive model did not significantly 
affect the company’s performance and probably due to the 
equity incentive contract design exists problem. Contractual 
elements of incentive stock options should be made on 
its own characteristics of listed companies, if it is blind 
imitation of the equity incentive plan may not be able to 
make the company’s performance improved.
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